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ABSTRACT: There is probably no conceptualisation of rights more famous than Ronald Dworkin’s 
claim that they are ‘trumps’. This seems to stand in stark contrast to the dominant, proportionality-
based strand of rights discourse, according to which rights, instead of trumping competing interests, 
ultimately have to be balanced against them. The goal of this article is to reconcile Dworkin’s work 
and proportionality and thereby make a contribution to our understanding of both. It offers a critical 
reconstruction of Dworkin’s theory of rights which does away with the misleading label of rights as 
‘trumps’ and shows that, far from being in conflict with proportionality, properly understood 
Dworkin’s work supports and supplements that doctrine and provides a much-needed account of its 
moral foundation as being about human dignity, freedom, and equality. 
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There is probably no conceptualisation of rights more famous than Ronald Dworkin’s claim 
that they are ‘trumps’. Yet, this is puzzling in at least two ways. First, it is not at all clear 
what it means to say that rights are trumps; whatever the correct answer may be, it cannot 
mean that rights such as the right to private life, the right to property, or the right to an 
education – to name just a few rights that are widely recognised in contemporary rights 
discourse – always or at least normally ‘trump’ all or most interests that clash with them. 
Second and related, by singling out their ‘trumping’ quality as their central, defining feature, 
Dworkin knowingly or unknowingly places his theory in sharp contrast to the dominant, 
proportionality-based strand of rights discourse, according to which rights, far from 
trumping conflicting interests, ultimately have to be balanced against them.  
The goal of this article is to reconcile Dworkin’s theory of rights and proportionality 
and thereby make a contribution to our understanding of both.2 As will be shown, the 
strength of Dworkin’s theory lies in the substantive moral foundation that it offers – in 
particular its conceptions of human dignity, freedom, and equality –, but its weakness is the 
structural account of rights as ‘trumps’, as evidenced by the fact that despite its fame this 
idea has never really resonated in legal practice. With regard to proportionality, the opposite 
picture presents itself: the doctrine does not give any indication as to its moral foundation – 
which is illustrated by the fact that its most famous theoretical account, namely Robert 
Alexy’s theory of rights as principles and optimisation requirements, is a formal theory – 
while offering a structure that has proven to be so useful that it has become the globally 
dominant tool of rights adjudication. It will become clear that it is possible and indeed 
important to reconcile and combine the structural strength of proportionality with the 
substantive moral appeal of Dworkin’s theory. In order to do so, the essay first offers a 
                                                 
2 Jacob Weinrib (‘When Trumps Clash: Dworkin and the Doctrine of Proportionality’, forthcoming in 
Ratio Juris) also aims to reconcile Dworkin and proportionality, but he takes a route that is different 
from mine. While this essay focuses more on the values that guide Dworkin’s theory and, as will be 
shown, proportionality analysis (human dignity, equality, and freedom), Weinrib focuses on the 
structure that reasoning with rights has for Dworkin under his rights-as-trumps approach, and 
discovers in Dworkin’s discussions of specific rights issues a range of claims regarding the conditions 
under which a right can justifiably be limited that, as he demonstrates, resemble the various stages of 
the proportionality test as applied, in particular, by the Canadian Supreme Court. This shows that 
even Dworkin himself was not able to maintain his own structural claim that rights are trumps 
without a considerable number of qualifications which bring its structure closer to proportionality; 
this weakens the plausibility of his claim that their nature as trumps is a general structural feature of 
rights.  
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critical reconstruction of Dworkin’s theory which is faithful to his core commitments but 
departs from his narrative and terminology where necessary; in other words, the article 
aims, in truly Dworkinian spirit, to present his theory in its best light.3 This leads to the 
conclusion that labelling rights as trumps is misleading and fails to capture what is 
important about them under Dworkin’s own intellectual commitments (I.). The essay then 
demonstrates that interpreting proportionality in light of Dworkin’s theory leads to a richer 
conception of the doctrine (II.). Finally, it shows that Dworkin’s theory properly understood 
provides us with a much-needed moral foundation of proportionality as based on his 
original and important conceptions of human dignity, freedom, and equality (III.); the paper 
thus makes the case for the continuing relevance of Dworkin’s theory of rights in the current 
‘age of proportionality’4. 
 
I. Dworkin’s theory of rights 
Dworkin’s theory of rights has evolved over the years and decades of his career.5 In this 
essay, I will work mostly with its last and, I believe, most appealing incarnation as presented 
in his books Is Democracy Possible Here?6 and Justice for Hedgehogs7. Readers who are familiar 
with Dworkin’s earlier writings may be surprised to find that many of the concepts and 
ideas that drove his earlier work are of little or no relevance in his last statement on rights. 
Generation after generation of jurisprudence students and scholars (including this author) 
have pored over ideas such as the distinction between external and internal preferences, 
utilitarianism as a background theory which necessitates the existence of rights, the famous 
right to equal concern and respect, and the principle-policy distinction. One can still find 
traces of them in Dworkin’s late work; however, they do not any longer occupy a prominent 
place. In my view – which I just state but do not defend in this paper – his final account of 
                                                 
3 On the nature of interpretation in general and the necessity to present the materials that are 
interpreted in their best light see Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing, 1986), ch. 2.  
4 This is a reference to the title of Alexander Aleinikoff’s influential article ‘Constitutional Law in the 
Age of Balancing’, 96 (1987) Yale Law Journal 943. 
5 For an instructive overview of the development of Dworkin’s thought see Paul Yowell, ‘A Critical 
Examination of Dworkin’s Theory of Rights’, 52 (2007) American Journal of Jurisprudence 93.  
6 Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton 
University Press, 2008) (henceforth: Dworkin, IDPH).  
7 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011) (henceforth: Dworkin, JH).  
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rights is superior to the earlier ones in that it focuses squarely on the important issues 
relating to the foundational values of human dignity, liberty, and equality; it thus overcomes 
and leaves aside the unnecessary complications arising mainly as a consequence of the 
unfortunate yet historically understandable entanglement of rights and utilitarianism which 
in my judgment – and presumably Dworkin’s own, given that he revised the theory 
accordingly – no longer resonate today.  
As a preliminary matter, Dworkin makes a conceptual distinction between 
constitutional and political rights.8 Political rights are those (moral) rights which ought to be 
protected as (legal) constitutional rights. So what Dworkin calls ‘political’ rights is what 
most constitutional theorists call ‘constitutional’ rights: not the specific rights of any 
particular constitution but rather those rights which a constitution ought to protect. With 
this clarification in mind, let us turn to Dworkin’s account of political rights.  
‘Most legitimate acts of any government involve trade-offs of different people’s interests; 
these acts benefit some citizens and disadvantage others in order to improve the 
community’s well-being on the whole ... But certain interests of particular people are so 
important that it would be wrong – morally wrong – for the community to sacrifice those 
interests just to secure an overall benefit. Political rights mark off and protect these 
particularly important interests. A political right, we may say, is a trump over the kind of 
trade-off argument that normally justifies political action.’9 
 
As mentioned above, I am going to criticise the usefulness of the term ‘trumps’ when 
characterising rights. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see some appeal in the notion of 
rights as trumps based on the above statement. For example, the government might claim, 
rightly or wrongly, that closing down my communist newspaper would improve the 
community’s well-being on the whole (because, say, workers would find less support for 
communist ideas and would therefore not go on strike as often, which would benefit the 
economy and thus enable the community to provide better education and hospitals to its 
citizens). However, my right to freedom of the press would function as a trump over these 
benefits to the community’s well-being and I would therefore continue to be entitled to 
publish my newspaper.  
How can we identify which rights we have? Dworkin explains: 
                                                 
8 Dworkin, IDPH, 30-1.  
9 Ibid., 31. 
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‘Someone who claims a political right makes a very strong claim: that government cannot 
properly do what might be in the community’s overall best interests. He must show why the 
individual interests he cites are so important that they justify that strong claim. If we accept 
the two principles of human dignity that I described in the last chapter, we can look to those 
principles for that justification. We can insist that people have political rights to whatever 
protection is necessary to respect the equal importance of their lives and their sovereign 
responsibility to identify and create value in their own lives.’10 
 
So we may say that for Dworkin, people have a right to be treated with dignity; it is the 
importance of human dignity that justifies the extraordinary moral force of rights, namely to 
block policies that might further the community’s overall best interests. Human dignity, for 
Dworkin, consists of two principles: the principle of intrinsic value (an equality principle) 
and the principle of personal responsibility (a liberty principle). The principle of intrinsic 
value ‘declares the intrinsic and equal importance of every human life’11: ‘each human life 
has a special kind of objective value. It has value as potentiality; once a human life has 
begun, it matters how it goes.’12. Among the clearest cases of violations of this principle, and 
therefore of rights, are discrimination and genocide13 because such acts rest on the belief that 
some human beings are worth less than others, or even worth nothing.  
The principle of personal responsibility ‘holds that each person has a special 
responsibility for realising the success of his own life, a responsibility that includes 
exercising his judgment about what kind of life would be successful for him.’14 Forcing a 
person to adopt the state’s official religion or punishing homosexual behaviour as being 
against God’s or the majority’s will would usurp the individual person’s responsibility to 
realise the success of his own life and would therefore violate the second principle of human 
dignity.  
Dworkin’s account of human dignity, equality, and liberty adds something 
distinctive to the often-cited claim that ‘every person should be treated as free and equal’ by 
specifying that equality is best understood as being about the equal and objective 
importance of every life and that freedom is concerned with every person’s individual 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 32. 
11 Ibid., 37. 
12 Ibid., 9.  
13 Ibid., 37.  
14 Ibid., 10.  
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responsibility to identify value in his or her own life. As so often, the devil is in the detail: in 
cases that are less clear than the examples mentioned above, how can we establish whether a 
policy respects or violates dignity? Dworkin gives us some guidance. With regard to the 
principle of personal responsibility, Dworkin argues that it necessitates two limitations on 
the state. First, there are certain foundational decisions which people must be free to make, 
such as ‘choices in religion and in personal commitments of intimacy and to ethical, moral, 
and political ideals’.15 Second, a law must not rely on a motive which assumes the 
superiority of one ethical ideal over another.16 Dworkin uses the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ 
in an idiosyncratic sense: for him, ethics refers to the duties a person has towards him- or 
herself, whereas morality refers to the duties a person has to others.17 For example, murder 
is immoral because it violates a duty one has to others (in particular, the possible victims). 
By way of contrast, determining and living one’s life in line with one’s religious convictions 
is a duty people have to themselves. While it is acceptable for the state to force people to live 
in accordance with collective decisions of moral principle (for example, to refrain from 
murdering), its laws must remain neutral between competing ethical ideals. Thus, 
moralism18 and (deep) paternalism are unacceptable.19 Furthermore, even laws that are not 
coercive may violate the second principle: for example, a display of the Ten Commandments 
in courtrooms would violate the requirement of state neutrality in questions of ethics.  
Dworkin is less clear about which rights can be derived from the first principle of 
human dignity. He states that due process (fair trial) rights flow from it20 and says, more 
specifically, that treating every person’s life as objectively and equally important requires 
refraining from inflicting the special and great harm of punishment on him unless his guilt is 
                                                 
15 Dworkin, JH, 368-9. 
16 Ibid., 369.  
17 Dworkin, IDPH, 20-21.  
18 While ‘moralism’ is a term widely used and understood, in Dworkin’s terminology, it would be 
more accurate to speak of ‘ethicalism’: forcing people to live in line with the state’s or majority’s 
ethical convictions.  
19 Dworkin, IDPH, 37-8, 73-4. (Impermissible) deep paternalism (where the state imposes its own 
preferred set of ethical values on a person in order to improve that person’s life) has to be 
distinguished from (permissible) superficial paternalism (which aims to help people achieve what 
they actually want) which is found, for example, in seat-belt laws.  
20 Dworkin, JH, 371-2.  
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proven.21 Furthermore, as mentioned above, the right not to be discriminated against 
obviously flows from the principle of equal importance.22 Most of Dworkin’s writing on 
equality is about distributive justice, and he has developed a theory – equality of resources – 
that is intended to help us structure an argument about which distribution of resources is 
fair.23 But it is unclear to what extent he believed that this is a matter of rights. Given that, 
for him, people have a right to be treated with dignity, and given that the first principle of 
dignity requires certain kinds of resource distribution, it would seem to follow that people 
ought to have constitutional rights to either a fair or at least non-arbitrary distribution of 
resources. However, to my knowledge, Dworkin has never made such a claim (possibly 
because his writing on constitutional rights is mostly concerned with U.S. constitutional law 
and he may have thought that such a view, however appealing as a matter of political 
morality, did not ‘fit’ well enough with U.S. constitutional history to qualify as the legally 
right answer).  
It is remarkable that Dworkin’s writing on rights oscillates between high level 
abstraction – in particular his account of the two principles of human dignity – and specific 
application – such as his well-known defence of abortion rights,24 or his writing on the 
importance of a strong protection of free speech.25 There is little in his scholarship relating to 
the room between high abstraction and concrete application, and it is possible that he 
thought that the best way to reason about questions of rights is to apply the abstract 
principles directly, without any intermediation, to any given specific problem. It is not my 
concern here whether or not this is adequate, but this starkly contrasts with accounts of 
rights that place proportionality front and centre because proportionality and related 
doctrines are located precisely in that middle space between foundational principles and 
concrete application. As far as I can see, the only structural point that Dworkin makes about 
rights is, precisely, that they function as ‘trumps’ over the community’s well-being. But 
while we were able to see the intuitive appeal of that statement, if we look at it again in light 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 372.  
22 See n 13 and accompanying text.  
23 Dworkin, JH, 356-363. 
24 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (Oxford University Press, 1996), ch. 1-4; Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An 
Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (Knopf, 1993).  
25 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (above n 24), ch. 7-10.  
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of a more nuanced understanding of his theory, the claim turns out to be misleading and 
unhelpful.  
It has some appeal in the case of the above-mentioned foundational decisions whose 
protection flows from the principle of personal responsibility. For example, we may say that 
the state must not prohibit the foundational decision of whether or not to have an abortion 
even if by doing so, it could enhance population growth and therefore greatly further the 
community’s well-being; in this sense the right to abortion functions as a trump. But in the 
other categories that Dworkin mentions, talk of rights as trumping the community’s well-
being is problematic. Let us first consider the prohibition of (deep) paternalism (which flows 
from the second principle of human dignity). Paternalism is motivated by the desire to 
improve the agent’s life; for example, a prohibition of sodomy might be motivated by the 
desire to lead gay people to lead less sinful lives. But it is unhelpful to frame such a policy as 
being about the community’s well-being (which rights can then trump): paternalism makes a 
claim to improve the affected person’s well-being; it is not necessarily concerned with any 
effects on the community. Second, with regard to rights flowing from the first principle of 
dignity, again, it is not obvious why these rights should be seen as trumping the 
community’s well-being. For example, it might be the case that dignity requires the right to a 
free education for all. Of course, someone who disputes this could try to argue that the 
community’s well-being would suffer under such a policy (to which Dworkin could then 
respond that the right to education trumps any such concerns). But an argument against free 
education need not be about the community’s well-being; it could be, for example, about 
justice, claiming that collecting the resources needed to fund education would for some 
reason be unjust towards the rich.  
So I think that it is unfortunate under Dworkin’s own commitments to create an 
opposition between rights and the community’s well-being. We might consider fixing this 
problem by regarding rights as trumping not only the community’s well-being but any value 
or consideration that conflicts with them: justice, well-being, utility, and so on. This, 
however, would amount to saying that rights must prevail over a policy that is justified on 
some other ground and would, in other words, simply point to the largely uncontroversial 
fact that policies need to comply with rights in order to be legitimate.  
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To conclude, I do not think that the claim that rights are trumps is fortunate. It had 
its role to play in the earlier versions of Dworkin’s theory26 but does not point to an 
important or insightful feature of rights in his later work; it should therefore be dropped. 
While less catchy, Dworkin should have claimed instead that the foundational right that 
people have is to be treated with dignity, and that this requires, first, that every policy 
respect the equal and objective importance of their lives and, second, that every policy 
recognise everyone’s personal responsibility for realising the value of his or her life.  
 
II. Proportionality and Dworkin’s theory of rights 
Proportionality-based judicial review usually employs a two stage analysis in order to 
answer the question of whether a given policy violates rights. The first question is whether 
the policy under consideration interferes with (limits, restricts) a right. The second is 
whether the interference is justified, and usually this is the case if it is proportionate. The 
first stage is of little practical relevance because of the phenomenon that George Letsas has 
called ‘rights inflation’:27 the scope of (prima facie) rights has become so broad in legal 
practice that it is difficult to find a case where the reviewing court concluded that the policy 
at stake did not interfere with a right and therefore was not in need of a justification. The 
consequence of this is that most if not all of the analytical work takes place at the second 
stage, where the test is proportionality.28 Proportionality has four steps.29 First, the policy 
                                                 
26 In his earlier work, he assumed – in line with the prevailing moral discourse at the time – that 
policies were usually justified on utilitarian grounds; rights came in to correct the occasionally 
impermissible aggregation of preferences that utilitarianism proposes. In that framework it made 
sense to say that rights trump utilitarian justifications.  
27 George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 126. 
28 This has led Webber to claim that ‘the entire constitutional rights-project could be simplified by 
replacing the catalogue of rights with a single proposition: The legislature shall comply with the 
principle of proportionality.’ (The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights [Cambridge 
University Press, 2009], 4). One might add that proportionality does not apply to all rights, though: 
some rights – for example the right to freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment – are absolute, meaning that any interference with them amounts to a violation and 
proportionality analysis does not apply. It is possible to reconcile absolute rights with proportionality 
by arguing that an interference with an absolute right is always disproportionate because it always 
imposes a burden on the right-holder that is more than he can be expected to bear. See  Kai Möller, 
The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012), 139-140.  
29 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002), 66; Mattias Kumm, 
‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights’, in Pavlakos (ed.), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal 
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that interferes with the right must pursue a legitimate goal (legitimate goal stage). Second, it 
must be a suitable means of achieving the goal at least to some extent; put differently, there 
must be a rational connection between the policy and the goal (suitability or rational 
connection). Third, there must not be a less restrictive and equally effective alternative 
(necessity; least restrictive means). Fourth and finally, the burden imposed on the right-holder 
must not be disproportionate; establishing this requires balancing the seriousness of the 
interference with the right against the importance of the competing interests (proportionality 
in the strict sense; balancing).  
On a superficial analysis, it seems clear that proportionality, by regarding rights as 
balancing requirements, stands in stark contrast to a conception of rights that regards them 
as trumps.30 But I have already shown in the previous section that Dworkin’s famous label 
does little to illuminate the structure of rights and that it is more adequate to summarise his 
theory as requiring that every person’s right to human dignity has to be protected, which 
means that every human life must be treated as having objective and equal importance and 
that every person’s sovereign responsibility for the success of his or her life must be 
respected. My argument in this section is that there is no conflict between his conception of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart, 2007), 131, 137; Kai Möller, ‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’, 
10 (2012) International Journal of Constitutional Law 709, 711. There are variations as to the precise 
formulations of the test which are however not relevant here.  
30 It is remarkable that Dworkin seems to never have written about proportionality as a doctrine of 
constitutional law (maybe because it is not used in the U.S., which is the jurisdiction that he was most 
familiar with and wrote about regularly). In Is Democracy Possible Here? [above n 6, 48-9] there is a 
brief engagement with limitations clauses in the European Convention on Human Rights; Dworkin 
simply states that ‘[t]hese qualifications were the result of political compromises that served to 
reassure countries hesitating to embrace the convention’ – a statement that is rather simplistic and 
inadequate as a general account of limitation clauses; this is followed, in the next paragraph, by a 
claim to the effect that an abstract right needs to be refined before it can be considered absolute. I do 
not think that a lot of insight about proportionality and limitations clauses can be gained from these 
cursory claims; rather, their ad hoc nature indicates that Dworkin never took these concepts seriously.  
Dworkin did occasionally discuss the idea of balancing; but usually he had in mind balancing in the 
sense of a utilitarian cost-benefit calculation which he rejected as not doing justice to questions of 
rights, a point with which I agree: balancing in constitutional rights law is concerned with a conflict of 
interests which must be resolved through moral reasoning; thus, balancing refers not to utilitarianism 
but must be used in the sense of ‘balancing as reasoning’ (see below fn 37 and accompanying text). 
See, for example, his ‘It is absurd to calculate human rights according to a cost-benefit analysis’, an 
opinion piece in the British Guardian, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/may/24/comment.politics (last accessed 24 April 
2017).  
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rights properly understood and proportionality, and that, indeed, interpreting the four 
stages of the proportionality test in line with the requirements of human dignity leads to a 
richer understanding of the test.  
 
1. The legitimate goal stage 
At the first stage of the test, the legitimacy of the goal pursued by the policy in question 
must be assessed. The abstract formulation of the proportionality test does not give any 
guidance as to what makes a goal legitimate or illegitimate; it is therefore necessary to 
interpret it in line with an attractive conception of rights. On the assumption that Dworkin’s 
theory provides such a conception, it can directly be applied here. As explained above, 
Dworkin claims that a law must not rely on a motive which assumes the superiority of one 
ethical ideal over another; this makes moralism and (deep) paternalism impermissible. Thus, 
a goal is illegitimate if it assumes the superiority of one ethical ideal over another.31 The 
textbook example of such a goal would be a law that prohibits homosexual sex on the 
grounds that such sex is ethically worthless, against God’s will, or harmful to the person 
engaging in it. Similarly, it would be impermissible to cite as the goal of a policy banning 
headscarves in public universities the view that an Islamic lifestyle in general, or a particular 
interpretation of Islam which makes the headscarf necessary, is ethically unappealing and 
should therefore be prohibited or discouraged.  
Of course, most cases are not as clear-cut as the examples I have just given; this raises 
the question of whether Dworkin’s principle of personal responsibility is also helpful for the 
resolution of more complex cases. I think that it is, and will use the European Court of 
                                                 
31 A parallel point was first made by Kumm (above n 29), 142-8. See also my discussion of the 
legitimacy of goals in Möller (above n 28), 183-93. I do not mean to exclude the possibility that a goal 
could also be illegitimate by virtue of being incompatible with the first principle of dignity, but it will 
fortunately be very rare in legal practice for a state to put forward such an argument. For example, a 
policy that disadvantages a minority ‘in order to give expression to their lesser value’ would be such 
a case. In practice, even obviously discriminatory practices are usually defended by relying on a goal 
that is in principle legitimate but that does not ultimately justify the policy at stake. For example, in 
the ‘gays in the army’ case of Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom (29 (2000) E.H.R.R. 493), the U.K. 
argued not that the goal of the policy was to express the view that homosexuals are ‘worth less’; 
rather it argued that allowing homosexuals to serve in the army would lead to tensions within the 
army and therefore to a threat to national security. Since protecting national security is obviously a 
legitimate goal, the ECtHR was right to accept the goal put forward by the U.K. and to let the policy 
fail at a later stage of the proportionality test.  
12 
 
Human Rights’ judgment in Stübing v. Germany,32 which concerns incest, as an illustration. 
While incest is an activity which many people will ethically disapprove of quite strongly, it 
is not obvious whether its prohibition can be justified, given that the moralistic or 
paternalistic goal of stopping people from living ethically worthless lives does not qualify as 
legitimate under Dworkin’s principle of personal responsibility. The fact that Germany did 
not even try to rely on this reason is an indicator of the appeal of Dworkin’s principle: 
banning an activity because of ethical disapproval would widely be seen as simply 
unacceptable and an unjustifiable intrusion into the personal life of the right-holder. The 
problem, however, is that even though the state may not openly rely on ethical disapproval, 
the motives that it cites instead may still violate the principle of personal responsibility for 
the following reasons. First, the goal, while not moralistic or paternalistic, may nevertheless 
and on closer inspection turn out to violate the principle of personal responsibility for other 
reasons; and second, the goal cited may serve as a pretext for a moralistic or paternalistic 
goal.  
Stübing is an example in point. In the case, Germany had argued that its ban on incest 
was justified because it pursued the goals of, first, protecting the family (the risk being an 
‘inversion of social roles’ within the family structure); second, the protection of the weaker 
partner in a relationship (the risk being a structural imbalance which posed a threat to the 
weaker partner’s general and/or sexual self-determination); third, preventing genetic 
damage to children; and fourth, maintaining a societal taboo against incest.33 The assumed 
need to maintain a societal taboo against incest is an instance of a goal that, while not openly 
moralistic or paternalistic, still (arguably) violates the second principle of dignity: a societal 
taboo against a particular behaviour means, broadly, that the respective behaviour (in this 
case, incest) is not seriously considered as part of the menu of options available to a person; 
a coercive measure designed to maintain an existing taboo can therefore be considered as an 
indirect form of thought control which, in turn, can be seen as violating the principle of 
personal responsibility by denying the individual the ability to reach his own judgment 
about the value of a particular activity.  
                                                 
32 Stübing v. Germany, (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 24.  
33 Ibid., paras 46-50.  
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The goal of preventing genetic damage to children can be seen as an example of a 
goal which is (arguably) legitimate but serves as a pretext for an illegitimate goal. As a 
preliminary point, it is not clear that the goal should be considered legitimate because it is 
arguable that it is better for children with a genetic defect to be alive than not to be alive at 
all. But assuming that the goal is indeed legitimate, the possibility exists that it serves as a 
pretext for the moralistic motives of the state because in other contexts, the risk of genetic 
damage to the child is never considered to be a valid reason to prohibit sex and/or 
procreation;34 for example, it is uncontroversial that disabled people have the right to 
procreate even if their children are likely to be disabled, too.  
Structurally, there are two ways of dealing with this problem. The first is to focus on 
the subjective motivation of the law-makers and inquire into their true motives. This, 
however, creates unanswerable questions because those motivations will often not be 
accessible; it also sets unfortunate incentives for lawmakers to hide and possibly lie about 
their true motives. The second and preferable way is to focus on the objective justifiability of 
the policy. Thus, in the Stübing example, preventing genetic damage to children would be 
considered to be a legitimate goal; however, the relevance of the fact that other forms of 
procreation leading to children with genetic damage are not prohibited would be considered 
at a later stage of the test.35  
The above remarks are not meant as a comprehensive discussion of the intricacies of 
Stübing; rather, their point is to show how Dworkin’s second principle of human dignity can 
successfully be integrated into the interpretation and application of the proportionality test 
and enrich the proportionality analysis.  
 
2. The balancing stage 
If a policy passes the legitimate goal stage, the next stages of the proportionality assessment 
concern its suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. For reasons of 
explication of my argument, this section will focus on the balancing stage. It is the final and, 
usually, decisive stage of the proportionality analysis and requires a balancing exercise 
                                                 
34 This argument was made by the applicant; see ibid., para. 36.  
35 This question could be considered at the balancing stage or arguably at a separate stage assessing 
the coherence of the policy. I have argued in favour of adding a coherence stage to the proportionality 
assessment in Möller (above n 31), 125-6. 
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between the right-holder’s interests and the competing public or individual interests; the 
overall question is whether the policy places a burden on the right-holder that is 
disproportionate, that is, more than he or she can legitimately be expected to bear.  
One of the issues pointed out by authors who are critical of balancing relates to the 
lack of clarity as to what the concept means in constitutional rights law.36 It seems obvious 
that properly understood it neither points to a mechanical exercise of quantification and 
comparison nor a utilitarian or consequentialist kind of reasoning; neither form of balancing 
would do justice to questions of rights.37 Rather, the starting point for any theory of 
balancing must be that balancing simply refers to the need to make a moral argument as to 
which of the two (or more) competing interests takes priority in a given case.38 This 
interpretation is preferable not only from a moral perspective; it is also compatible with the 
semantic meaning of the term: for example, when we speak of the need to find a ‘balanced’ 
solution to a moral problem, this means that we are looking for a solution which attaches the 
correct weight to all relevant considerations and is therefore morally defensible. But if 
balancing simply refers to the need to construct a moral argument about the competing 
values, which value or values should guide it? 
I wish to suggest that Dworkin’s principles of human dignity can be interpreted to 
provide us with a theoretical starting point if not a comprehensive theory of balancing. In a 
nutshell, I will argue that the balancing stage of the proportionality test is concerned with 
ensuring that the policy at stake respects the equal importance of the right-holder’s life. 
Thus, balancing is shorthand for assessing the compliance of a policy with the first principle 
of human dignity.  
This can be explained in the following way. To say that we have to ‘balance’ the 
burden on the right-holder against the importance of the competing right or public interest 
refers to the imperative of designing policies in a way that is ‘balanced’ – that is, that 
distributes burdens and benefits in a way that is compatible with the principle of equality. 
                                                 
36 Grégoire Webber (above n 28), 88-9; Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An assault on human 
rights?’, (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 468; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (MIT Press, 1998), 259. 
37 George Letsas, ‘Rescuing Proportionality’, in Cruft, Liao, and Renzo (eds.), Philosophical Foundations 
of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2015), 316, 325-6. See also above n 30.  
38 Möller (above n 29), 720-1; Möller (above n 31), 140. 
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Conversely, to say that a policy is disproportionate (in the strict sense) means that the state 
has attached too little weight to the interests of the right-holder: if it had attached the correct 
weight, it would have noticed that the burden on him or her was too high and therefore 
disproportionate. But to attach too little weight to someone’s interests means to fail to treat 
his interests as equally important as everyone else’s interests, and therefore fails to 
acknowledge the equal importance of his or her life.  
Let me give as an example the recent case of S.A.S. v. France,39 where the European 
Court of Human Rights decided that the French ban on the full-face veil was compatible 
with the European Convention on Human Rights. The goal pursued by the ban, which the 
Court found to be legitimate, was the protection of ‘the ground rules of social 
communication’ and the conditions of ‘living together’.40 One of the issues at stake was 
whether a ban on the full-face veil was a disproportionate burden on those women wishing 
to conceal their faces for religious reasons. If we assume (with the dissent) that it was, then 
we are saying that France asked for ‘too much’ from the affected women and that, 
correspondingly, it attached too little weight to the legitimate interests of those women. 
Thus, it failed to treat them as someone whose lives have an importance that is equal to 
everyone else’s.  
Admittedly there is little direct support in Dworkin’s writing for my claim that the 
first principle of dignity requires what constitutional rights lawyers usually refer to as 
balancing. Most of his writing about specific rights issues is about the second principle of 
dignity: think of his well-known defences of abortion, hate speech, or euthanasia. When he 
writes about the first principle, he is mostly concerned not with rights but with theories of 
distributive justice (in particular, taxation).41 However, there is no reason why the first 
principle should be entirely or even predominantly about fair taxation, and Dworkin himself 
certainly did not intend it to be; for example, he claims in Justice for Hedgehogs that the right 
to due process flows from the principle of equal importance,42 and he states in Is Democracy 
Possible Here? that certain forms of torture, discrimination, and genocide violate the first 
                                                 
39 S.A.S. v. France, (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 11. 
40 Ibid, paras 121-2.  
41 See above n 20 - 23 and accompanying text.  
42 Dworkin, JH, 371-2. 
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principle.43 As mentioned before, my goal in this article is not to engage in Dworkin 
exegesis, but rather to reconstruct his theory in a way that is coherent and shows it in its best 
light. To regard the reach of the first principle of dignity as restricted to questions of 
resource distribution and/or blatant denials of equal worth strikes me as arbitrary.44 
Therefore, it is not only possible but indeed necessary to hold that the principle of equal and 
objective value demands a proportionate, ‘balanced’ distribution of burdens and benefits; 
and this is precisely what under proportionality is assessed at the balancing stage.  
In a slightly different context, Letsas has considered an argument which points to an 
important objection to my approach here. He writes about the famous Hatton case,45 which 
was about a policy allowing night flights at Heathrow airport which affected the sleep of 
some of the residents in the area. Letsas is critical of protecting the interest in good sleep as 
part of Article 8 ECHR and balancing it against the competing interest in economic 
development. He accepts that the interest in good sleep is an important interest and that 
justice and equality (for our purposes: Dworkin’s first principle of human dignity) might 
have something to say about its adequate protection. But:  
‘Perhaps the Heathrow night flights scheme did not allocate the various resources in play 
(sleep, economic benefits, employment) in a way that treats people as equals under some 
egalitarian theory of distribution. Perhaps the applicants have a solid claim based on 
distributive justice to request the government to restrict or abolish night flights, relocate the 
airport, or compensate the residents. But these are not matters falling within the law of 
human rights. We cannot inflate the concept of human rights so much that it covers the 
whole realm of justice. Human rights would then lose their distinctive moral force.’46 
 
Applied to the issue that is my concern at this point, the problem can be presented in the 
following way. If we accept, with Dworkin, that (1) rights are about dignity, (2) dignity is, 
among other things, about treating people’s lives as equally important, and (3) this means 
that burdens and benefits must be distributed in a just way, then it would seem to follow 
                                                 
43 Dworkin, IDPH, 37.  
44 To avoid misunderstandings: I agree with Dworkin that the first principle of human dignity 
prohibits the acts Dworkin mentions. Under contemporary human and constitutional rights law, 
these acts would usually be regarded as absolutely prohibited, meaning that proportionality analysis 
would not apply or (alternatively) that any interference with the respective right would be regarded 
as disproportionate; on this see above n 28; my point is only that the first principle should have a 
wider application than Dworkin seems to imply.  
45 Hatton v. U.K., (2003) 37 EHRR 28.  
46 Letsas (above n 27), 129. 
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that the scope of rights becomes so broad as to cover the whole domain of justice. This 
would be problematic because it is widely and, to my mind, correctly accepted that not 
every policy which is unjust also violates rights.  
I believe that there is indeed a structural weakness in Dworkin’s writing about rights 
and human dignity because he does not address, let alone resolve, this important point; as 
mentioned above, as far as I can see, he does not make any systematic attempt to work out a 
theory of the relationship between the first principle of human dignity and the scope of 
rights. However, the correct answer to this problem is not to radically ban all considerations 
relating to balancing from the scope of rights, as Letsas seems to suggest.47 Rather, another 
and more appealing solution is to distinguish between justice and rights in a different way, 
namely by claiming that rights require only that a policy be based on a reasonable, as 
opposed to the one correct, conception of justice, and that therefore, a distribution of 
burdens and benefits is proportionate as long as it is reasonable.48 This approach finds 
considerable support in the case law of courts that rely on proportionality, which regularly 
make statements to the effect that their task is not to establish whether the legislature 
designed the best possible (or ‘just’) policy but rather only to review whether the burden on 
the right-holder is justifiable or reasonable.49  
 
3. The suitability and necessity stages 
The suitability and necessity stages, too, can be explained as flowing from Dworkin’s first 
principle of dignity. Let us first consider the case of suitability. An unsuitable policy places a 
burden on the right-holder but does not contribute to the achievement of its goal. This can 
easily be shown to violate Dworkin’s first principle of human dignity because treating a 
person’s life as (equally) important surely requires abstaining from burdening him for no 
reason. A similar consideration applies in the case of necessity; an unnecessary policy 
                                                 
47 Letsas concludes his chapter by stating: ‘If we want to be accurate we have to say that in cases 
like Hatton, states’ margin of appreciation is infinite and in cases like Dudgeon states have no margin 
of appreciation whatsoever.’ (ibid., 130). I interpret this as meaning that any balance of interests 
would be acceptable in Hatton, which is just a different way of saying that no balancing should take 
place at all.  
48 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-
Based Proportionality Review’ 4 (2010) Law & Ethics of Human Rights 141; Möller (above n 31), 117-123.  
49 Möller (above n 31), 200-204. 
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burdens the right-holder to a greater extent than necessary because the legitimate goal could 
be achieved to the same extent through a less burdensome policy. Again, respect for human 
dignity requires choosing the less burdensome policy because placing an unnecessary 
burden on the right-holder fails to treat his life as (equally) important.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Dworkin’s theory of rights properly understood is compatible with proportionality, and 
furthermore, it illuminates the meaning and interpretation of the different stages of the test. 
One of the by-products of integrating Dworkin’s theory with proportionality is a challenge 
to conventional wisdom according to which there exists a contrast between liberty rights 
(such as the rights to life, freedom of religion, association, expression, and the right to 
private life) and equality rights (in particular the right to non-discrimination). The previous 
sections have shown that reasoning with so-called liberty rights requires an appreciation of 
liberty as well as equality: the legitimate goal stage of the proportionality analysis is 
concerned with liberty in that it ensures that the personal responsibility of the right-holder is 
respected; the following three stages (suitability, necessity and balancing/proportionality in 
the strict sense), however, are, on the analysis presented in this paper, concerned with 
equality because a ‘balanced’ or proportionate policy distributes burdens and benefits in a 
way that respects every affected person’s equal importance; conversely, a disproportionate 
policy, by imposing a burden on the right-holder that is unsuitable, unnecessary or 
disproportionate, fails to treat the right-holder’s life as equally important.  
 
III. The importance of Dworkin’s contribution in the age of proportionality 
So far I have offered a critical reconstruction of Dworkin’s theory of rights, and I have 
shown that when viewed in its best light it is compatible with proportionality and can 
indeed inspire a richer and more appealing interpretation of the four stages of the test. This 
section will offer some additional reflections on the importance of Dworkin’s theory for the 
current debates about proportionality and rights.  
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Proportionality has been immensely successful as a legal doctrine: it was invented not 
by scholars or theorists of rights but by judges,50 and it had become a globally successful tool 
of rights adjudication long before the first comprehensive theory of it was published.51 Thus, 
its success is primarily based on its practical usefulness for judges deciding cases about 
constitutional rights: it offers them a helpful structure by splitting up the question of 
whether a policy violates rights into four sub-questions that can be analysed separately. This 
is no small achievement. But while the role of proportionality as a tool and a legal doctrine 
has certainly been extremely useful, for a long time there was no agreement on, in fact not 
even a conversation about, the values on which proportionality-based judicial review is 
based. The fact that the first major and most famous account of proportionality-based 
conceptions of constitutional rights, namely Robert Alexy’s theory of constitutional rights as 
principles and optimisation requirements, is a formal theory, that is, one which explicitly 
rejects the possibility of a substantive – value-based – theory of constitutional rights,52 
underlines this feature of the proportionality discourse.  
In recent years a couple of substantive theories have been proposed. Mattias Kumm 
has argued that proportionality-based judicial review protects every person’s right to 
justification by instructing judges to engage in Socratic contestation in order to determine 
whether an act by a public authority is justifiable in terms of public reason.53 I have 
contributed to the debate by arguing that the point of constitutional rights is to ensure that 
any act which limits a person’s ability to live her life according to her self-conception is 
justifiable to her; that this justification is successful if the policy at stake rests on a reasonable 
specification of the spheres of autonomy of equal citizens; and that proportionality properly 
understood assesses precisely this question.54 We ought to add Dworkin’s conception of 
rights and dignity to these existing attempts to make sense of proportionality. The rough 
outline of a conception of constitutional rights that emerges from my reconstruction of his 
                                                 
50 On the history of proportionality, see Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality 
Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’, (47) 2008-9 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72, sections 
III and IV.  
51 Namely Robert Alexy’s (above n 29). 
52 Ibid., 11. 
53 Kumm (above n 48).  
54 Möller (above n 31), passim. 
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theory is the following. The foundational right that everyone has is to be treated with 
human dignity. Thus, any law or other act by a public authority must respect his equality 
(more precisely: the equal and objective importance of his life) and his freedom (his personal 
responsibility for the success of his life). The justification of the principle of proportionality, 
then, lies in its ability, if properly interpreted, to ensure the protection of human dignity and 
its two sub-principles. At the legitimate goal stage, any justifications that are incompatible 
with the value of personal responsibility are discounted. The following three stages 
(suitability, necessity and balancing) assess whether the policy distributes burdens and 
benefits in a way that can reasonably be regarded as compatible with the person’s equal 
importance. 
The existing theories of the point and purpose of constitutional rights are not 
mutually exclusive and not even necessarily in competition with each other; rather, they 
highlight different facets of the values underlying constitutional rights. Kumm’s emphasis is 
on the fact that all state action must, as a matter of rights, be justifiable in terms of public 
reason; thus, his focus is on the structural and institutional conditions of legitimate 
authority; and while he believes that a conception of public reason as well as a more fully 
worked-out account of the right to justification will have to say something about freedom 
and equality, he does not provide a conception of these values. In my previous work, I have 
attempted to spell out more concretely the meaning of equality and, in particular, autonomy 
as structural building blocks of a theory of rights, but I have stopped short of providing a 
moral grounding of those values. Dworkin’s emphasis, by way of contrast, is directly on the 
substantive values that ground rights and legitimacy, that is, the two dimensions of human 
dignity. Furthermore, there are links between the right to justification (that grounds rights in 
Kumm’s and my accounts) and human dignity (which grounds rights for Dworkin): Rainer 
Forst (who first proposed the idea of a right to justification as the basis of human rights) has 
claimed that human dignity implies first and foremost that every person be treated as 
possessing a right to justification.55  
Thus, Dworkin’s theory of rights should not be sidelined as one that is in 
competition with proportionality and therefore, at least for the time being, on the losing side 
                                                 
55 Rainer Forst, ‘The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive 
Approach’, 120 (2010) Ethics 711, 717.  
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of history and of limited interest and relevance. Rather, his insights should be integrated 
with the currently dominant, proportionality-oriented discourse about rights. The 
importance and relevance of his work lies in its ability to, first, guide the interpretation of 
the different stages of the proportionality test and, second, provide a distinctive account of 
the moral foundation of proportionality-based approaches to rights as being about human 
dignity, liberty, and equality.  
 
